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ENTRENCHMENT CHALLENGES TO
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
In 1950' Congress enacted the Cefler-Kefauver Act2 as an amend-
ment to section 7 of the Clayton Act 3 the basic merger provision of the
antitrust laws.4 The purpose of the amendment was to plug loopholes
in the original act' and thus fortify the merger law. A review of the
1. Prior to 1950, § 7 of the Clayton Act read, in pertinent part:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create
a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
2. Celler-Kefauver Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (amending ch. 323,
§ 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
3. Section 7 now reads, in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one
or more corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any sec-
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition. . . may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
4. Mergers are also susceptible to challenge under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I
(1976). The last time a merger was challenged under § 1, however, was in 1948. See United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
5. To effectuate that purpose Congress made several significant alterations in the wording of
the section. For a general, but comprehensive, discussion of the changes in wording of § 7 of the
Clayton Act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). See generally
Bok, Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics 74 HARV. L. REV. 226,
233-38 (1960); Handler & Robinson,.4 Decade ofAdministration ofthe Celler-Ke/auverAntimerger
Act, 61 COLUM. L. Rnv. 629, 652-74 (1961). Prior to the amendment, § 7 applied only to a firm's
acquisition of the stock of another firm. See, e.g., Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC,
291 U.S. 587, 595 (1934); FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 557-60 (1926); United States v.
Celanese Corp., 91 F. Supp. 14, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-13 (1962). The amendment included the acquisition of assets within the
reach of the Clayton Act. See ProposedAmendments to Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act: Hearings on
H.R. 515 Before Subcomm. 2 ofthe House Comm on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).
See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-13 (1962); Davidow, Conglomerate
Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1231, 1236 (1968). Prior to 1950, § 7 read, "where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition," and consequently applied only to horizontal mergers. H.R. REP. No.
1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949). See, eg., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313
(1962); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919
(1968). Contra, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590-93 (1957).
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legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act reveals that Congress was
deeply concerned about increased market concentration. Congress
feared that an increase in concentration was producing radical changes
in the structure of American industry7 by eliminating small business
and local control.' Congress viewed mergers as the primary means by
which business concentration increased 9 and thus chose the regulation
of mergers as the vehicle for curbing increased concentration' 0 and re-
Congress deleted this language to extend § 7 beyond horizontal mergers to reach vertical and
conglomerate mergers as well. H.R. RP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949)o See Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936,
944 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); Hood, Potential Competition, 21 ANTITRUST
BULL. 485, 486 (1976). Contra, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
590-93 (1957).
Congress altered § 7 to read, "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1949). See
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318-23 (1962); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386
F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1967); Blair, 7he Conglomerate Merger in Economics andLaw, 46 GEO. L.J.
672, 700 (1958). Congress intended that the vagueness of this clause should provide the courts
with ample latitude to effectuate the purpose of the amendment, that is, to thwart further concen-
tration of American industries. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1949). See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 315 (1962); Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 412
U.S. 928 (1973); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 519 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). See generally Brodley, Ohigopoly Power Under the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 289 (1967);
Hood, supra, at 485.
6. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1949).
7. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess.
3 (1949). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
8. 96 CONG. REC. 16444, 16448, 16450, 16452, 16503 (1950); 95 CoNG. REC. 11486, 11489,
11494-95, 11498 (1949). See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 & n.29 (1962); Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 507 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). See generally Brodley, supra note 5, at 289; Hood,
supra note 5, at 485.
Congressional concern over the effect of conglomerate mergers on local control and small busi-
ness continues to this day. See Conglomerate Mergers, Their Effect on Small Business and Local
Communities: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Activities Affect-
ig Small Business of the House Comm on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
9. A House Report provides ample evidence of the congressional view on mergers.
That the current merger movement has had a significant effect on the economy is
clearly revealed by the fact that the asset value of the companies which have disappeared
through mergers amounts to 5.2 billion dollars, or no less than 5.5 percent of the total
assets of all manufacturing corporations-a significant segment of the economy to be
swallowed up in such a short period of time.
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1949).
10. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,317-18, 343-44 (1962); Stanley Works
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viving the possibility of deconcentration."
Conglomerate mergers, 12 that is mergers between economically unre-
FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); General Foods Corp. v.
FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
11. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1964); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 279 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374
U S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963). See generaly Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate
Mergers, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1361, 1378 (1968).
12. A conglomerate merger is typically defined as any acquisition that is neither horizontal
nor vertical. Blair, supra note 5, at 672; Davidow, supra note 5, at 1232; Turner, Conglomerate
Mfergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARY. L. REv. 1313, 1314-15 (1965). But see Ed-
'ards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE
PoLICY 331 n.1 (1955) (indefiniteness of the terms "horizontal" and "vertical").
The courts have defined a horizontal merger as "one between two actual competitors in the
same market," United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 734 n.5 (D. Md.
1976). See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374
U S. 321, 323, 364 (1963).
The courts also have provided a definition of vertical merger.
A vertical merger usually involves an acquisition in a market where the acquiring firm
has been a buyer or a seller, and where a customer-supplier relationship has existed
between the acquired and acquiring companies prior to the merger. Typically by a verti-
cal merger a manufacturer will integrate its manufacturing processes forward.
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 734 n.5 (D. Md. 1976). See, e.g.,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590-93 (1957); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 593
(6th Cir. 1970).
Courts have distinguished three basic types of acquisitions within the broad category of con-
glomerate mergers: the product extension merger, the geographic extension merger, and the pure
conglomerate merger. See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 734 n.5
(D. Md. 1976). See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 124 (2d ed. 1980); Goldberg, The Effect of Conglomerate Mergers on Competition,
16 J.L. & EcON. 137, 137-38 (1973).
A product extension merger occurs when a conglomerate acquires a firm that produces a prod-
uct functionally related to a product produced by the conglomerate. See United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 734 n.5 (D. Md. 1976). In Black & Decker the court stated:
"A product extension merger ... is undertaken by the acquiring company to expand its product
line into a complementary product area." Id See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568,
577-78 (1966); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 548 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
A geographic extension merger occurs when a conglomerate acquires a firm producing the same
product as the conglomerate, but distributes it in a different geographic market. See F. SCHERER,
supra, at 124; Goldberg, supra, at 137-38. In Black & Decker the court defined a geographic
extension merger as "a firm's acquisition of a company in its product line doing business in a
geographic area not previously entered by the acquiring firm." United States v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,734 n.5 (D. Md. 1976). See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorpora-
tion, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 528
(1973).
In the pure conglomerate merger, the acquiring and acquired firms' products and markets are
completely unrelated. See Turner, supra, at 1315. In Black & Decker the court stated that "[a]
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lated firms, 3 were relatively novel occurrences when Congress enacted
the Celler-Kefauver Act.14  Although Congress intended that the
amended section 7 apply to conglomerate mergers,15 knowledge of the
potential anticompetitive effects of these mergers was lacking. 16 With-
out more information on conglomerate mergers, Congress was unable
to prescribe a precise standard by which the courts could determine
whether a particular merger might substantially lessen competition.1
7
Conglomerate mergers subsequently presented difficult antitrust
problems for the courts.'" The anticompetitive effects of a conglomer-
ate merger, unlike horizontal 9 and vertical2" mergers, are not readily
pure conglomerate merger, perhaps rarer than the other two types, occurs between companies that
do not interrelate economically." United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,
734 n.5 (D. Md. 1976). See, eg., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1966); United
States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971);
United States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. IM. 1969). See general, F. SCHERER,
supra, at 124; Note, Conglomerates andSection 7 Is Size Enough?, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 337 (1970).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act reaches all three types of conglomerate mergers. H.R. REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949). See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1966); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 n.31 (1962); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Con-
sol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 509-10 n.7 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Gen-
eral Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). See
generaly Hood, supra note 5, at 486; Turner, supra, at 1315 & n.6.
13. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 74 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
909 (1974); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 734 n.5 (D. Md. 1976).
14. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Since enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act, however, the number of conglomerate mergers has
increased while the number of horizontal and vertical mergers has decreased dramatically. See F.
SCHERER, supra note 12, at 558. See also note 22 infra.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 & n.36 (1962). See generally
Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and
Tomorrow'r Legislation, 58 B.U.L. REv. 199, 228 (1978). See also Handler & Robinson, supra
note 5.
18. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 582 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring); General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
19. A horizontal merger removes a competitor from the market, thus concentrating the mar-
ket. For example, assume that the market of all manufacturers of widgets is composed of ten
firms. If one of those firms merges with another firm in that market, then only nine firms remain
as competitors in the market. Thereafter the market shares are divided among nine firms instead
of the original ten. 2 C. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAW 527a, p. 3 7 6 (1978). See, e.g.,
Freuhauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979).
20. A vertical merger may foreclose competitors from purchasing from or selling to the verti-
cally integrated firms, thus removing those transactions from the arena of competition. For exam-
ple, assume that prdduction of widgets is dependent on a steady supply of a raw material,
widlium. Assume also that only three firms produce widlium, all of which are independent. If
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apparent.21 Recent merger activity22 has spurred increased interest in
the negative competitive impact of conglomerate mergers. Under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, three grounds are available to challenge the
legality of a conglomerate merger:23 potential competition,24 reciproc-
ity,25 and entrenchment. 26  In numerous instances, potential competi-
Able Manufacturing, a manufacturer of widgets, acquires Baker Corp., a producer of widlium,
then the acquisition may stifle competition in two ways. If thereafter Able buys widlium only
from Baker, then the other widlium producers are foreclosed from competing with Baker for
Able's widlium orders. If thereafter Baker sells widlium only to Able, then the other widget man-
ufacturers are foreclosed from competing with Able for Baker's widlium supply. See Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1962); Freuhauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352 & n.9
(2d Cir. 1979).
21. General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919
(1968). See generally Turner, supra note 12.
22. See G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 5-7 (1980). Benston traced the course of
merger activity from 1895 to 1977 and found that there were three distinct merger waves prior to
the early 1970s: the 1899 to 1901 wave, the 1919 to 1930 wave, and the late 1960s wave that
peaked in 1968. See also F. SCHERER, supra note 12, at 119-27. After the 1968 peak, merger
activity dropped dramatically. Id at 120.
The total number of completed mergers and acquisitions rose from 1,207 in 1977 to 1,279 in
1978, but dropped to 1,214 in 1979. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT ON
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 25 (1981). The number of merger announcements rose to 1,889 in
1980 and 2,395 in 1981. [1982 Transfer Binder] 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 154 (BNA).
The total number of large conglomerate acquisitions rose from 76 in 1978 to 87 in 1979. FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 109 (1981). The
number of mergers valued at over $100 million increased from 94 in 1980 to 113 in 1981. [1982
Transfer Binder] 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 154 (BNA). The number of mergers valued
at over $1 billion surged upward from 4 in 1980 to 12 in 1981. Id The 1981 statistics include the
largest acquisition in United States history: du Pont's $7.5 billion acquisition of Conoco. Id
23. See generaly Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, [1968-1] TRADE RaG. REP.
(CCH) 4,510 at 6887-89.
24. Potential competition is defined as
the acquisition by a company not competing in the market but so situated as to be a
potential competitor and likely to exercise substantial influence on market behavior. En-
try through merger by such a company, although its competitive conduct in the market
may be the mirror image of that of the acquired company, may nevertheless violate § 7
because the entry eliminates a potential competitor exercising present influence on the
market.
United States v. FalstaffBrewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1972). See United States v. Marine
Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1966); United States v.
Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909
(1974); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973); United States
v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966). See generally G. BENSTON, supra note
22; Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. I (1977); Hood,
supra note 5; Turner, supra note 12, at 1362-64; Comment, ToeholdAcquisitions and the Potential
Competition Doctrine, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 156 (1972).
25. In Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 413 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), the court
provided a definition of reciprocity:
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tionz7 and reciprocity28 have served as the sole or major reason for
invalidating a merger. In the past, entrenchment played merely a sup-
porting role in merger proceedings.29 The federal courts have rarely
invalidated a merger on entrenchment grounds alone.30  Recently,
however, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has given entrench-
ment a more prominent role in conglomerate m erger challenges 3' and
in one case persuaded the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to invali-
date a merger solely on entrenchment grounds.
32
The term reciprocity refers to a seller's practice of utilizing the volume or potential
volume of its purchases to induce others to buy its goods or services. Its counterpart,
reciprocity effect, refers to the tendency of a company selling or desiring to sell to an-
other company to channel its purchases to that company.
Id at 434. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965); Southern Concrete
Co. v. United States, 535 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Gulf&
Western Indus., Inc. v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 694 (2d Cir. 1973); Allis-Chal-
mers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1009 (1970); C. Leonardt Improvement Co. v. Southdown, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1146, 1149
(C.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (N.D. 111. 1969);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 57-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Most commentators have severely criticized reciprocity as a valid ground for nullifying a
merger. See Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under theAntitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
69 (1964); Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1964);
Turner, supra note 12; Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies.- 4 Widening of0ntitrust
Targets, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 187 (1967). But see Harsha, The Conglomerate Merger and Reel-
procit-Condemned by Conjecture?, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 201 (1964).
26. See notes 36-86 infra and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
28. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965); Gulf & Western
Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 694 (2d Cir. 1973); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009
(1970).
29. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1966) (acquisition invalidated on
both entrenchment and potential competition grounds); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467
F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972) (acquisition invalidated on entrenchment, potential, and actual competi-
tion grounds), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969) (acquisition invalidated on both entrenchment and potential
competition grounds), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1965) (same); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (acquisition invalidated on entrenchment, potential, and actual competition grounds). See
generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 227-28.
30. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919
(1968).
31. See, ag., Heublein, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,763 (Docket 8904, Commission
order issued October 7, 1980); In re Beatrice Foods Co., No. 9112 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980); In re
Tenneco Inc., No. 9097 (FTC May 27, 1980).
32. In re Beatrice Foods Co., No. 9112 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980).
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The validity of voiding a conglomerate merger on entrenchment
grounds alone is questionable. Both courts33 and commentators34 have
attacked the alleged anticompetitive effects of entrenchment as empiri-
cally groundless. An allegedly entrenching merger may indeed have
procompetitive effects, such as deconcentrating the market.35
This Note examines entrenchment analysis to determine whether it
alone is sufficient to invalidate a conglomerate merger. This Note will
first define entrenchment and discuss entrenchment's allegedly an-
ticompetitive effects. Then the development of the judiciary's en-
trenchment analysis is traced. Finally, this Note critiques the judicial
analysis and concludes that an allegedly entrenching merger rarely, if
ever, produces any anticompetitive effects.
I. ENTRENCHMENT
Entrenchment occurs when a conglomerate 36 enters an oligopolistic
market37 by acquiring a firm that holds a significant position in the
33. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.)
("more metaphorical than real"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
34. Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 529, 531 (spec. ed. 1970) (no logical or empirical foundation).
35. See G. BENSTON, supra note 22, at 51; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 128 (1959); Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1371;
Note, supra note 12, at 348.
36. A conglomerate is any firm that is extensively diversified, such that it has holdings in a
variety of markets. See general 7 Goldberg, supra note 12, at 139. There are no clear guidelines
for determining when a firm is sufficiently diversified to warrant the name "conglomerate." A
firm can diversify by two methods: internal expansion or acquisition. Id at 139. Diversification
by internal expansion is called "de novo" entry into a market. Conglomerate diversification by
acquisition is called a "conglomerate merger" unless the conglomerate acquires a direct competi-
tor (the horizontal merger) or it acquires a firm that either buys from or sells to the conglomerate
(the vertical merger). See note 12supra. If the conglomerate acquires a firm that has a very small
share of the target market, the acquisition is a "toehold" acquisition. See generally Comment,
supra note 24.
37. An oligopolistic market is a highly concentrated market with the few largest sellers hav-
ing a significant market share. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 27; Whitney, supra
note 25, at 247-48. Kaysen and Turner have proposed guidelines for determining when a market
is highly concentrated. An atomistic structure or market is an industry in which there are no large
firms and no firm with a large share of the market. A loose oligopoly is a market in which the
market share of less than twenty firms totals 75% or more, with no one firm having a market share
greater than 15%. A tight oligopoly is a market in which the market share of less than eight firms
totals 50% or more, with the largest firm having a market share of not less than 20%. A dominant
firm or partial monopoly is a market in which one firm has a market share of at least 50%, with no
other firm having a significant share of the market. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at
72. The Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice provide a graduated scale of the market
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target market.38 A number of factors have emerged as fundamental to
identifying entrenchment. 39  The acquiring firm is necessarily a large
firm or "giant" with considerable economic power.40  The acquired
firm is a substantial, but not necessarily the dominant factor in a target
market 4 that is highly concentrated or oligopolistic. 42 The target mar-
ket, either because it is highly concentrated or because of the nature of
the goods produced, exhibits high barriers to entry.43 The merger must
shares of the acquiring and acquired firms for determining when the Department will ordinarily
challenge an acquisition of a firm in a concentrated market. A market is "highly concentrated"
when the market shares of the four largest firms total 75% or more. The Department will chal-
lenge an acquisition when the merging firms have the following market percentages:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% 1% or more
A market is "less highly concentrated" when the market shares of the four largest firms total less
than 75%. The Department will then challenge an acquisition when the merging firms have the
following market percentages:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% or more 1% or more
Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, [1968-1] TRADE REo. RaP. (CCH) 4510, at 6884.
38. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON Tm LAW OF MERoERS 441 (1973); Bauer,
supra note 17, at 226; Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1363; Davidow, supra note 5, at
1253.
39. See generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 226-29.
40. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). See generally E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 441; Bauer, supra note 17,
at 226; Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1363; Davidow, supra note 5, at 1253.
41. See United States v. CroweU, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404
U.S. 801 (1971). See generally E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 255; Campbell & Shepherd, supra
note 11, at 1363; Davidow, supra note 5, at 1253; Sloviter, The October 1973 Term Merger Cases.:
Whither Clayton 7?, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 861, 888-89 (1975).
42. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 571 (1967); Kennecott Cooper Corp. v.
FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 70 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); General Foods Corp. v.
FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). See generally E. KINT-
NER, supra note 38, at 255; Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1363; Davidow, supra note 5,
at 1253. See also note 37 supra.
43. A barrier to entry is defined as:
something equivalent to the "state of potential competition" from possible new sellers.
Let us view it moreover as evaluated roughly by the advantages of established sellers in an
industry overpotential entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the extent to which
established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without at-
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provide opportunities for the acquiring firm to transfer substantial
competitive advantages to the acquired firm.' Most entrenchment
cases consequently entail an element of synergy45 between the acquired
and acquiring firm's product lines, marketing procedures, or manufac-
turing techniques.46 Finally, the merger must entrench, that is, rigidify
or increase, market concentration.47
Under entrenchment analysis, the allegedly entrenching merger gives
rise to identifiable anticompetitive effects in the target market a.4  These
racting newftrrns to enter the industry. As such, the "condition of entry" is then prima-
rily a structural condition, determining in any industry the intra-industry adjustments
which will and will not induce entry. Its reference to market conduct is primarily to
potential rather than actual conduct, since basically it describes only the circumstances in
which the potentiality of competition from new firms will or will not become actual.
J BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION 3 (1962) (emphasis in original). See Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). See
generally J. BAIN, sunpra, at 11-19; Sloviter, supra note 41, at 889.
44. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 866 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,774 (D.
Md. 1976). See generally Davidow, supra note 5, at 1257.
45. Simply stated, synergy occurs when the two firms are able to operate more efficiently
and profitably together than apart. From the business standpoint, synergy occurs when
the whole of two firms is greater than the sum of its parts. Synergy might result from the
complementary nature of the firms' businesses, the ability of the resulting firm to create
efficiencies through centralizing operations such as purchasing, the improvement of
managerial techniques through utilization of newly available personnel and skills, and
from a variety of other factors.
Mergers and Economic Concentration: Hearings on S. 600 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Mo-
nopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 67 (1979)
(prepared statement of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division). See
generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 227.
46. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); General Foods Corp. v.
FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 774 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F.
Supp. 637, 644-45 (C.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F.
Supp. 983, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543,
554-56 (N.D. I11. 1968); In re Sterling Drug Inc., 80 FTC 579, 604-05 (1972). See generally S. LEE
& R. COLMAN, HANDBOOK OF MERGERS, AcQuIsrrIONS AND BuYouTs 150 (1981); Bauer, supra
note 17, at 227.
47. See generally United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592
(1965); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919
(1968); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976). See also E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 225, 441; Davidow, supra note 5, at 1253, 1258.
48. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 78-79 (10th Cir. 1972),
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anticompetitive effects are largely predicated on the central characteris-
tic of entrenchment-the conjunction of a conglomerate and an oligo-
polistic market,49 each of which individually is the potential source for
significant anticompetitive effects.
The conglomerate's "bigness" may allow the firm to incur lower
costs.50 The conglomerate, because of its diversification, can spread
selling costs over a number of goods, thus reducing unit costs across its
entire range of products.5 Large firms, having better access to
financial institutions and capital markets, can obtain credit at more
favorable rates and thus save in capital costs. 2 The large conglomerate
may achieve economies of scale 3 in distribution, research, manage-
ment, or other functions and thereby lower costs.5 4 When a firm is suc-
cessful in reducing expenses, smaller competitors, who are unable to
match these reductions, may suffer losses, lose market power, and even-
tually leave the market.55
The conglomerate, also because of its diversified enterprises, can en-
gage in predatory pricing56 by subsidizing losses incurred in one prod-
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 774
(D. Md. 1976).
49. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1932).
50. See id. at 118. See generalo Blair, supra note 5, at 685; Davidow, supra note 5, at 1285;
Edwards, supra note 12, at 334-36; Whitney, supra note 25, at 235-36.
51. See Blair, supra note 5, at 680-81; Brodley, supra note 5, at 361. See generally Edwards,
supra note 12.
52. See Brodley, supra note 5, at 361; Edwards, supra note 12, at 348; Turner, supra note 12,
at 1338.
53. In defining economies of scale, one commentator has stated:
As the plant (generally defined as an aggregate of productive facilities at a single loca-
tion) becomes larger up to some point, the firm operating it is able to obtain lower costs
per production techniques that involve (a) the specialization of labor to specific narrow
tasks; (b) the use of specialized machinery and other capital equipment, including units
of equipment which are available in only very large minimal sizes; and (c) the speciali-
zation of management and supervising personnel to narrow and detailed tasks. Exploita-
tion of all these opportunities as the plant becomes bigger will result in lower unit costs.
J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 166 (2d ed. 1968). See generally P. AscH, ECONOMIC THE-
ORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 30-32 (1970); C. PRATTEN, ECONOMICS OF SCALE IN MANU-
FACTURING INDUSTRIES 3-5 (1971); E. ROBINSON, THE STRUCTURE OF COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY
(4th ed. 1958); SCHERER, supra note 12, at 81-118 (2d ed. 1980).
54. See Asch, Industrial Concentration, Efficiency andAntitrust Reform, 22 ANTITRUST BULL.
129, 130 (1977); Turner, supra note 12, at 1317, 1322; Note, supra note 12, at 347.
55. See Turner, supra note 12, at 1322.
56. See United States v. New York Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 87 (7th Cir.
1949). See generally A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 451 (1936); Blair, supra note 5, at
686; Turner supra note 1 at 1322-23. See also notes 13 & 14 supra and accompanying text.
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uct line with profits from another.57 The conglomerate can thus
deliberately undercut competitors' prices, driving those competitors
who cannot meet the lower prices out of the market.
58
The conglomerate's bigness may have an adverse psychological im-
pact on competition.59 Smaller competitors in the market may compete
less vigorously out of fear of retaliation by the conglomerate. 60 Firms
with a desire to enter a particular market may refrain from entering so
as to avoid competition with a giant.
61
In comparison with the market influence exerted by conglomerates,
oligopolistic markets give rise to very different anticompetitive effects.
The foundation of the fear of oligopolistic markets is the assumption
that a decrease in the number of competitors is accompanied by a de-
crease in competition.62 The firms in an oligopolistic market, recogniz-
ing that profits are higher when the firms cooperate than when they
compete,63 grow into a state of mutual interdependence. 64 The larger
firms may either tacitly or expressly set prices for the entire industry
and thus completely eliminate competition. 65  If the market were less
57. See generally Adelman, Integration andAntitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 44 (1949);
Blair, supra note 5, at 686.
58. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-82 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1910). See generally R. BoRIC, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
144-159 (1978); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
ShermanAct, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 697 (1975).
59. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 575 (1967). See generally Blair, supra
note 5, at 683-84; Edwards, supra note 12, at 336; Turner, supra note 12, at 1322-23; Whitney,
supra note 25, at 236.
60. See general'y Bok, supra note 5, at 275; Brodley, supra note 5, at 350-51.
61. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968). See generally Turner, supra note 12, at 1322-23, 1345.
62. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 172 (1964); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964). See generally Adams, Antitrust and Oligopoly: A
New Law is Needed, 9 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 49, 49 (No. 2 1977); Brodley, supra note 5, at
291, Hood, supra note 5, at 485.
63. See generally F. ScHERER, supra note 12, at 151-56, 168.
64. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 172 (1964); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964). The Court in Akcoa succinctly described this
aspect of oligopolistic market behavior. "As that condition (oligopoly) develops, the greater is the
hkelihood that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will emerge." United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964). See generally C. KAYSEN & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 35, at 27; Adams, supra note 62, at 49; Whitney, supra note 25, at 247-48.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). See generally J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 437-52 (2d
cd 1968); Bok, supra note 5, at 242-43; Brodley, supra note 5, at 289-90; Hall & Weiss, Corporate
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concentrated, all firms would presumably engage in competitive
pricing. 66
In addition to those anticompetitive effects associated with conglom-
erates and oligopolistic markets, entrenching conglomerate mergers po-
tentially involve other anticompetitive effects.67  The acquiring
conglomerate may have a "deep pocket," that is, substantial financial
resources68 which enables it to bestow competitive advantages onto the
acquired firm.69 These deep pocket advantages are not limited to
cheaper capital and credit,70 but rather encompass derivative advan-
tages such as advertising discounts and research.71 The acquiring firm
Profits & Size of Firms (unpublished manuscript) (cited in Hall, The Cases in And/rust: Reconsid-
ered, 10 ANTITRUsT BULL 897, 900 (1965)).
66. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176 (1964). Courts originally
adjudicated oligopoly pricing cases under the Sherman Act, which was completely ineffective in
dissuading price collusion. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). See generally Brodley, supra note 5, at 293-97;
Turner, The Defnition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Farallelism andRe/usals to
Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 655, 657-84 (1962).
Since 1962, courts have dealt with oligopolies under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.
13 (1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
67. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 78-79 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 774
(D. Md. 1976).
68. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 535-36 n.18 (3d
Cir. 1969) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC,
309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F.
Supp. 983, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19, 38 (D. Conn.
1970), apfpeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). See generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 226; Blair,
supra note 5, at 693; Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1367-68; Whitney, supra note 25, at
233; Note, supra note 12, at 350.
69. See generally Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1367; Davidow, supra note 5, at
1253.
70. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
71. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1966); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White
Consolidated Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1009 (1970); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. ITT
(Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). See generally
Bauer, supra note 17, at 227-28; Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1367.
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may also transfer its marketing and management skills to the acquired
firm.
7 2
Under entrenchment analysis, the acquired firm's new competitive
advantages have a significant impact on the structure of the target mar-
ket. The entrenching merger heightens both psychological and actual
barriers to entry.7 3 Potential competitors may choose alternatives to
entering a market that requires competition with a giant.74  The ac-
quired firm's competitive advantages in advertising, promotion, mar-
keting, and technological innovation may stifle any incentive to enter.75
Finally, the conglomerate's presence may "chill" price competition 76
and eliminate actual competitors' inducement to compete.7 7 These ef-
fects tend to increase market concentration 7 by inducing smaller com-
petitors to join forces in order to remain competitive 9 or by forcing
smaller competitors out of the market altogether.80
Although neither Congress nor the courts have adopted a per se rule
against entrenchment,8 l any merger involving a dominant firm in an
72. See United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). Cf. United States v. Hughes Tool. Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 645 (C.D.
Cal. 1976) (skills transferred by acquiring corporation of no benefit to acquired corporation). See
generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 227-28.
73. See United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 991 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1968). See
generally E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 254.
74. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968). See generally Means, Conglomerates and Concentration, 25 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1, 29
(1970); Turner, supra note 12, at 1356.
75. See Emhart Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 182 (1st Cir. 1975). See
generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 227.
76. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1966). See generally Blair,
supra note 5, at 689-90; Davidow, supra note 5, at 1256-57; Turner, supra note 12, at 1358.
77. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). See generally Blair, supra note 17, at 692-93; Campbell &
Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1371.
78. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968). See generally Davidow, supra note 5, at 1253.
79. See United States v. CroweU, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 991 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
80. See generally Turner, supra note 12, at 1322.
81. See Emhart Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 181 (Ist Cir. 1975).
Congress' decision not to ban outright mergers or diversification is consistent with the Supreme
Court's rejection of per se rules with respect to the validity of mergers. See, e.g., United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 (1974).
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oligopolistic market is suspect.82 Successful use of entrenchment analy-
sis to invalidate a merger requires more than a mere showing of an
increase in economic concentration 83 or that the acquiring firm has a
deep pocket.84 Entrenchment analysis also does not invalidate mere
improvements in the acquired firm's efficiency.85 Under section 7, the
merger must produce a reasonable probability of producing specific an-
ticompetitive effects. 6
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ENTRENCHMENT
Although the Supreme Court recognized the possible anticompetitive
effects of entrenchment as early as 1931,87 in Ekco Products v. FTC
88
82. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Stanley Works v. FTC,
469 F.2d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 1972).
83. See United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed,
404 U.S. 801 (1971); United States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. I1. 1969). See
generally Note, supra note 12, at 338.
84. See Emhart Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 181 (lst Cir. 1975); Mis-
souri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883
(1974); United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108, 140 (E.D. Penn. 1978).
85. See Emhart Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 182 (1st Cir. 1975). See
generally Turner, supra note 12, at 1322-29.
86. See Emhart Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 181 (1st Cir. 1975); United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1968). See generally Da-
vidow, supra note 5, at 1257. See also Whitney, supra note 25; Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Its Application to the Conglomerate Merger, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 623 (1972).
The merger need not actually restrain competition in the target market. The wording of § 7
indicates that the merger need only produce an effect that "may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.
1967) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). Inclusion of the words "may be"
indicates that Congress intended § 7 to reach mergers and acquisitions in their incipiency. See
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,317 (1962); Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498,
503 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMil-
lan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMil-
Ian, Inc. the court stated, however, that "it (§ 7) cannot be called into play to thwart a non-existent
danger." Id Therefore, a merger or acquisition that has a reasonable probability of producing
anticompetitive effects, not a remote possibility or a complete certainty, is illegal under the Clay-
ton Act. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594-95 (1965); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
323 (1962); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1977); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 1965); Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Crowell, Collier &
MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
297 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
87. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1932). In Swfl the Court refused to
modify a consent decree prohibiting five leading meat packers from suppressing competition by
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the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals established the conceptual foun-
dation of entrenchment analysis.8 9 In 1954, Ekco, one of the nation's
leading producers of household kitchen equipment,9" acquired McClin-
tock, a producer of meat handling equipment." Prior to the acquisi-
tion, McClintock was the dominant firm in two lines of products:
92
commercial meat handling platters and pans and commercial meat-
handling carts and racks. Four years after Ekco acquired McClintock,
McClintock acquired Blackman,93 the only other major producer of
both product lines.94 The court found that access to Ekco's financial
resources was a necessary condition of McClintock's acquisition of
Blackman. On the basis of an increase in market concentration after
concerted action and various vertical acquisitions. Although the defendants had entered the con-
sent decree pursuant to an action brought under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court, in review-
ing the consent decree, focused on the possibility of a "giant" engaging in predatory practices in
an oligopolistic market and thus sowed the seed from which entrenchment analysis has grown. Id
88. 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
89. In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963), decided two years
before Ekco, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was concerned with Ingersoll-Rand's contem-
plated acquisition of three companies holding major positions in the underground coal mining
equipment manufacturing market. Id at 518. The court stated: "The record demonstrates abun-
dantiy that the acquisitions which Ingersoll-Rand proposes to make will place under its control
companies which have accounted for and will account for a very substantial share of the total
industry output in three significant lines of commerce." Id at 524. The court held, however, that
the acquisitions would violate § 7 because of the potential for reciprocity. Id Ingersoll-Rand,
consequently, is not a significant contribution to the formulation of entrenchment analysis.
90. 347 F.2d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 1965). Ekco manufactured kitchen tools, tinware, cutlery,
commercial baking pans, and large aluminum meat boxes. Id
91. Id at 746. In characterizing the meat handling equipment market, the court stated that,
"it seems established that there are no high barriers to entry into the commercial meat-handling
equipment business. Necessary capital requirements are not large, raw materials are in ample
supply and distribution outlets are readily available." Id at 750.
92. The court found that McClintock held a "virtual monopoly" in the commercial meat-
handling platters, pans, and lugs market and was the "nation's largest producer" in the commer-
cial meat-handling carts and racks market. Id at 748. The court did not, however, provide mar-
ket share data for either line of products for the period prior to the acquisition of McClintock.
93. Id at 747. Because Ekco had previously purchased McClintock, its acquisition of
Blackman, which produced the same products as McClintock, was a horizontal merger. The court
found that the Ekco/McClintock acquisition of Blackman was per se illegal. Id at 751.
94. Id at 747. In 1958, just before its acquisition by Ekco/McClintock, Blackman held a
10.4% share of the commercial meat-handling, platters, pans, and lugs market. Id at 749. At that
same time, Blackman held a 9.3% share of the commercial meat-handling carts and racks market.
Id at 750.
95. Id at 752. The court stated that, "McClintock had little cash and was subject to a highly
restrictive loan agreement at the time Blackman was purchased. Thus, it appears unlikely that
McClintock would have purchased Blackman but for Ekco's financial resources." Id
Washington University Open Scholarship
552 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:537
the acquisition of Blackman, 96 the court held that Ekco's acquisition of
McClintock had entrenched the market.97 The court, however, did not
elaborate on its entrenchment analysis.
In 1967, the Supreme Court laid down the fundamentals of entrench-
ment analysis in FTC v. Procter & Gamble,98 the single most important
entrenchment case. 99 In 1957 Procter & Gamble, a large diversified
manufacturer of household products,"° principally soaps, detergents,
and cleaners, acquired Clorox, a manufacturer of liquid bleach.10 1
Clorox accounted for nearly forty-nine percent of liquid bleach sales, a
dominant position in a highly concentrated market.'0 2 The two firms
used the same distribution channels and the same type of massive ad-
vertising, thus exhibiting a synergistic relationship.10 3
The Court held that the acquisition manifested potential for substan-
tial anticompetitive effects and ordered divestiture."°4 The Court iden-
tified the major anticompetitive effect as the contraction of the
competitive structure of the market by the raising of entrance barriers
96. In 1958, the year of its acquisition of Blackman, Ekco/McClintock held a 76.1% share of
the commercial meat-handling platters, pans, and lugs market, id at 749, and an 81.9% share of
the commercial meat-handling carts and racks market. Id at 750.
The court's market share data indicate, however, that Ekco/McClintock's market share dropped
dramatically in the years between Ekco's acquisition of McClintock and the acquisition of
Blackman. In 1955, the year after Ekco's acquisition of McClintock, Ekco/McClintock held a
93% share of the platters, pans, and lugs market. By 1958, however, its share of that market had
dropped to 76.1%. Id at 749. In the carts and racks market, Ekco/McClintock held a 98.3% share
in 1955 and an 81.9% share in 1958. Id at 750. Ekco/McClintock lost sales because of vigorous
competition from Blackman, a relatively new entrant, and another competitor. Id
Ekco/MeClintock's sales did not rise until it had purchased Blackman.
97. Id The court concluded: "This shows to our satisfaction the reasonable probability that
Ekco's purchase of McClintock may serve to entrench and preserve McClintock's monopoly." Id
98. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
99. See generally E. KI NrTNE, supra note 38, at 225; Goldberg, supra note 12, at 140; Hood,
supra note 5, at 497; Whitney, supra note 25, at 237-40.
100. 386 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1966). In 1957, the year of the merger, Procter & Gamble held just
over 54% of packaged detergent sales. Procter & Gamble and two other manufacturers, Colgate-
Palmolive and Lever Brothers, together held 80% of the market. Procter & Gamble's profits in
1957 were $57,000,000 on $1,100,000,000 in sales. Its assets were over $500,000,000. Id
101. Id at 571.
102. Id In 1957, Clorox and its nearest competitor, Purex, held 65% of the liquid bleach sales.
These two, together with four other competitors, held almost 80% of the market. Clorox had
annual sales of $40,000,000 and assets of $12,000,000. Id
103. Id at 577. In 1957, Procter & Gamble spent more than $80,000,000 on advertising and
$47,000,000 on sales promotion. Id at 573. In the same year, Clorox spent $3,700,000 on adver-
tising and $1,700,000 on sales promotion. Id at 572.
104. Id at 580-81.
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and the discouraging of competitive efforts by smaller competitors. °5
The merger also eliminated Procter & Gamble as a potential
competitor. °6
The Court referred to Procter & Gamble's huge advertising budget
as seminal to the growth of entrance barriers.' 7 Because all liquid
bleaches are virtually identical,' advertising was the sole means of
producing product differentiation in the consumer's mind and thus was
intimately linked to product sales.1°9 The merger would enable Procter
& Gamble to transfer its advertising expertise and budget to Clorox,1 0
leading to a market share increase for Clorox.'1
The Court also found that smaller competitors would fear retaliation
105. Id at 578.
106. Id at 580-81. For a definition of potential competition, see note 24 supra.
107. Id at 579. The Court stated:
The acquisition may also have the tendency of raising the barriers to new entry. The
major competitive weapon in the successful marketing of bleach is advertising. Clorox
was limited in this area by its relatively small budget and its inability to obtain substan-
tial discounts. By contrast, Procter's budget was much larger, and although it would not
devote its entire budget to advertising Clorox, it could divert a large portion to meet the
short-term threat of a new entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume discounts to
advantage in advertising Clorox. Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to
face the giant Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox.
id
108. Id at 572.
109. Id A4ccord, General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 991-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Ill.
1968). See generally Blair, supra note 5, at 686-87; Turner, supra note 12, at 1332, 1336-37;
Whitney, supra note 25, at 251.
110. 386 U.S. at 579 (1966). The merger would also allow Clorox to take advantage of Procter
& Gamble's large advertising budget to purchase bulk advertising discounts. Id
111. Id Subsequently Purex instituted a treble-damage action against Procter & Gamble and
Clorox, alleging that Procter & Gamble's acquisition and retention of Clorox had caused $500
million of harm to Purex. Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 419 F. Supp. 931, 933 (C.D. Cal.
1976), vacated andremanded, 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979). The court held that during the period
that Procter & Gamble had held Clorox, the merged companies had not engaged in anticompeti-
tive practices and denied the award. Id at 934. The court found that Procter & Gamble did not
bestow competitive advantages in the form of advertising expertise and budget on Clorox. Id at
936, 940-41. Focusing on Purex's entry into the Erie, Pennsylvania market, the court found that
Purex spent over $3.00 in advertising per case of liquid bleach sold, in contrast to its normal
expenditure of less than 6¢ per case, and garnered 30% of that market. Clorox was spending 90€
per case in that same market. Id at 940. The court stated: "Procter did not dip into its 'deep
pockets' for the benefit of Clorox. Sales promotions were financed strictly out of proceeds from
the sales of liquid bleach, just as they had been prior to the merger." Id at 934. Although Purex's
market share went down from 43.7% in 1958 to 37% in 1967, its profits on bleach rose from $1.7
million in 1958 to $2.7 million in 1965. Id at 943.
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by Procter & Gamble if they competed aggressively.112 Because of its
large cash reserves and income from other operations, Procter & Gam-
ble could cut prices, absorb the losses, and force competitors out of the
market." 3 Procter & Gamble's size would, in addition, intimidate
present and future potential competitors.1 4 The Court concluded that
these probable effects showed that the merger would entrench the
market. 15
In GeneralFoods Corp. v. FTC'16 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that entrenchment alone was sufficient to invalidate a merger.17
In 1957 General Foods, one of the nation's largest producers of pack-
aged foods," 8 acquired S.O.S., one of the nation's largest manufactur-
ers of steel wool pads.' 19 The steel wool pad market was highly
concentrated, with S.O.S. and its principal competitor, Brillo, holding
approximately ninety-eight percent of the market.'20 The court found
112. 386 U.S. at 578. The Court stated that, "[t]here is every reason to assume that the smaller
firms would become more cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by Procter." Id
But see note I ll supra.
113. Id at 579 n.3. But see note Ill supra. See generally Bauer, supra note 17, at 227. In
Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 419 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and remanded,
596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979), the district court found that Clorox had not engaged in any activities
during its retention by Procter & Gamble that it had not engaged in prior to the acquisition. Id. at
934-36.
114. 386 U.S. at 579. In Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 419 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal.
1976), vacated and remanded, 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979), the court found that Purex had not
acted out of fear of retaliation by Clorox in any managerial decisions. Id at 945-48. Rather, the
court attributed Purex's inferior market position to the decisions of its management. Id at 943-45.
The court also noted that in its sales forecast for 1960, Purex predicted "an upsurge of private
label brands" as a major competitive force. Id at 946.
115. 386 U.S. at 578. The Court concluded that "[i]t is probable that Procter would become
the price leader and that oligopoly would become more rigid." Id
116. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). See generally 19 SYRAcUsE
L. REv. 1028 (1968); 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 430 (1968).
117. 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967). The court held that "[a]s in Clorox, the degree of
market power enjoyed by G.F. [General Foods]... made it likely that the market would become
an even more rigid oligopoly." Id
118. Id at 937. The court found that all of General Foods' products were "low priced high-
turnover household consumer commodities," id, which would have a synergistic interaction with
steel wool pads in terms of advertising, distribution, and the ultimate purchaser, the housewife.
Id at 944.
119. Id at 938.
120. Id at 939. S.O.S.'s and Brillo's market shares fluctuated dramatically between 1955 and
1962. In 1955, S.O.S. held 52.8% and Brillo 45.7% of the market. In 1957, the year of the merger,
S.O.S. held 51% and Brillo 47.6% of the market. This trend continued after the merger. By 1959
S.O.S. held only 49.4% of the market. In 1960, however, S.O.S.'s share surged upward, reaching
56% in 1962. Id See also 19 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1028, 1028 n.3 (1968).
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that steel wool pads, like liquid bleach, 121 require advertising to induce
product differentiation and, consequently, stimulate sales.122 The court
emphasized that General Foods, because of its high advertising
budget,123 could transfer competitive advantages in the form of adver-
tising and marketing promotions to S.O.S. 124 Finding in addition that
the merger would upset the pre-merger competitive balance between
S.O.S. and Brillo, 25 heighten actual' 26 and psychological barriers to
entry,127 and dampen Brillo's incentive to compete,1 28 the court af-
firmed an FTC order of divestiture. 29
In United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. 130 the government
asked a district court to enjoin a proposed acquisition of Nissen Corpo-
121. See text accompanying notes 108 & 109 supra.
122. 386 F.2d at 945.
123. In 1957, General Foods spent $69 million for advertising and promotions for all products.
In 1958, General Foods' advertising expenditures jumped to $87 million. By 1961, General Foods
, as the nation's third largest advertiser. Id at 938.
124. id After acquiring S.O.S., General Foods substantially altered S.O.S.'s advertising and
marketing techniques. Id Prior to its acquisition, S.O.S. had averaged spending $1.25 million
ypearly on advertising. After the acquisition, S.O.S. averaged $2.25 million yearly. The increase
,as largely due to expenditures for advertising slots on expensive evening television shows. Id at
'38 n.6. But see Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 J.L. & ECON.
321 (1968). Peterman studied the television rate structures for the years applicable to the Procter
& Gamble/Clorox acquisition, the same years pertinent to the General Foods/S.O.S. acquisition,
and found that the rate structures did not favor large firms. Id at 396. S.O.S. consequently spent
more on advertising, an act not inconsistent with a declining market share, but it did not thereby
achieve greater access to advertising discounts.
125. 386 F.2d at 945. The court did not present any market share data for the years subse-
quent to 1962. In 1963 Purex Corporation, a diversified manufacturer of household consumer
products with total sales of $127 million in 1963, acquired Brillo. Id at 939 n.9.
126. Id at 945. The steel wool pad market exhibited extremely high barriers to entry prior to
General Foods acquisition of S.O.S. The machinery necessary to manufacture steel wool pads
was very complicated and not generally available. Id at 937. The household steel wool pad
market was composed of several regional markets, all characterized by either S.O.S. or Brillo
having a monopoly share in that region. Id at 938 n.5. Shipping costs for the pads were very
high, manageable only by a very large firm. _d
127. Id at 946. The court stated that "the entry of such a large, well-financed, aggressive
competitor would necessarily hamper whatever effect potential competition had in the pre-merger
market. This result follows because the threat of entrance into a given market by potential com-
petitors is reduced to the extent that entry barriers are raised." Id
128. Id The court observed, however, that Brillo brought out a new package design and in-
creased its advertising expenditures, even though its market share declined. Id at 939 n.8. The
court also noted without elaborating that General Foods' market power would enable it to engage
m retaliatory acts against aggressive competitors. Id at 946.
129. Id at 937 & 947.
130. 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. IM. 1968). See generaly 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 219 (1968).
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ration, the leading manufacturer of gymnastic equipment, 131 by Wilson
Sporting Goods Company, the largest manufacturer of a broad line of
sporting goods and equipment.' 32 Although expanding rapidly, 33 the
market for gymnastic equipment,' 34 in which Nissen held a thirty-two
percent share, 135 was highly concentrated. 136 The court issued a pre-
liminary injunction blocking the merger 137 on both entrenchment 38
and potential competition 39 grounds.
In analyzing the possibility of entrenchment in the target market, the
court focused on the potential competitive advantages to Nissen from
having access to Wilson's huge distribution system of 10,000 dealers.
40
Nissen, in contrast, relied primarily on an eight man sales force.'
4
'
Wilson's dealers were dependent on Wilson for credit, assistance in
131. 288 F. Supp. at 545.
132. Id at 546. Wilson manufactured over 8,000 different items, most of them sporting goods,
and most of which it manufactured itself. Id
133. Id at 546. From 1965 to 1967, sales of gymnastic equipment grew from just under $8
million to slightly under $13 million, an increase of over 60%. Id at 546 n.4.
134. Barriers to entry in the gymnastic equipment market were not high. The initial capital
investment necessary to enter was quite low. Required machinery was readily available and the
technology was not complex. Id at 553-54. Many new companies had entered in the period just
before the proposed acquisition of Nissen. Id at 553 & 554 n.21.
135. Id at 546. Nissen's market share, however, fell from 38% in 1965 to 32% in 1967. Id
136. Id The gymnastic equipment market was composed of 23 manufacturers. The top four
firms accounted for over 60% of the market and the top nine firms for over 97%. Id The court
observed that the market share data did not present a realistic portrait of the market. Only four
firms, including Nissen, were able to make equipment that met Olympic and National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) standards. Only equipment that met the Olympic or NCAA strict
specifications was used at sanctioned meets. .Id at 546-47. The court noted that its market share
data, was a composite of both Olympic and non-Olympic equipment and did not accurately depict
sales of Olympic equipment. Id at 547. The court observed also that many of the smaller com-
petitors did not manufacture a full line of gymnastic equipment, which cast doubt on the accuracy
of the data. Id
137. Id at 570.
138. Id at 559.
139. Id at 562-63.
140. Id at 554. The number of dealers used by Wilson represented approximately 90% of all
sporting goods dealers. Id Wilson also employed a 250 man sales force. Id at 554-55.
141. Id at 547. The sales force presold equipment to the customer, usually a coach or athletic
director, who then placed the order through a dealer. Nissen distributed its products through 38
exclusive dealerships, 17 of whom also sold Wilson products. Nissen received less than half of its
orders "picked up" by its exclusive dealerships, most of which also handled Wilson products. The
dealers received a 15% markup for their efforts. Nissen's competitors usually offered a 50%
markup to dealers, largely because their products were lower priced in comparison with Nissen's
products. Id at 547.
The court also noted that customers did not purchase gymnastic equipment on the basis of
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bidding for large contracts, 142 billing, and service. 143 A dealer that had
a particular school as a regular customer would recommend Nissen
products to gain favor with Wilson.'" As to non-institutional buyers,
Wilson's dealers could either initiate the sale or relay information
about a prospective buyer to Nissen's sales force.' 45
The court did not find an adverse psychological impact on actual
competition, 46 but found instead that the merger would produce a psy-
chological impact on potential competition. 47 Large broad-line sport-
ing good manufacturers, 48 other than Wilson, would respond to the
acquisition of Nissen by also acquiring a firm in the market. 4 9 These
subsequent acquisitions would increase concentration in the market by
substituting large diversified firms for small single market compa-
nies.' 50 A series of large firms buying into the market would also deter
small firms from entering and binder their survival.' 5'
In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,
Inc. ,152 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the competitive
emotion and, consequently, advertising was a minor factor in sales. Customers were sophisticated
consumers who purchased equipment on the basis of quality. Id at 552.
Wilson represented to the court and Nissen's shareholders that it would maintain Nissen as a
separate subsidiary and retain Nissen's pre-merger sales operations. Id at 547. The court ob-
served that should Nissen's market share continue to decline, see note 134supra, the possibility of
integrating Nissen was not foreclosed. Id at 556.
142. Id at 554.
143. Id at 555.
144. Id
145. Id at 556.
146. Id at 556-57. The court observed that Nissen by itself possessed the financial capability
to cut prices should it continue to lose sales. The court noted that Nissen's acquisition by Wilson
would not add much to Nissen's ability to engage in predatory price cutting. The court stated that
"we are now entering upon such wholly speculative ground that it has passed the bounds of util-
ity." Id at 557. The court also recognized the equal likelihood that smaller competitors would
increase their competitive efforts in the face of the merger. Id
147. Id at 557-58.
148. The court identified Rawlings, Spalding, and MacGregor as the major broad-line manu-
facturer potential entrants, all of whom had expressed interest in the gymnastic equipment mar-
ket. Id
149. Id
150. Id at 558.
151. Id at 557-58. Medalist, a relatively small broad-line sporting goods manufacturer, had
planned to enter the market prior to learning of the Wilson/Nissen merger. Medalist's plans did
not change because of the planned acquisition. Id at 557.
152. 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). Allis-Chalmers asked the
trial court to restrain White from acquiring any more of Allis-Chalmers' stock. The trial court
denied the preliminary injunctions on the ground that Allis-Chalmers had failed to show a sub-
stantial likelihood that on the merits Allis-Chalmers would prove itself to be a potential entrant to
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impact of an association between Allis-Chalmers and Blaw-Knox if
White acquired Allis-Chalmers. 53 Blaw-Knox, a subsidiary of White,
was the third largest manufacturer of metal rolling mills with twenty
percent of the market.'54 The metal rolling mills market was highly
concentrated, with the top four firms controlling eighty percent of the
market.15 Allis-Chalmers, although not a manufacturer of metal roll-
ing mills, manufactured electrical drive and control systems for metal
rolling mills.156 Allis-Chalmers was the third largest manufacturer of
control systems in a market in which the top three firms held ninety
percent of the market share.' 7
The court found that the association of Allis-Chalmers and Blaw-
Knox would make them the only company capable of delivering a
complete metal rolling mill, designed, produced, and installed by a sin-
gle entity. 5 The court observed that no other manufacturers of metal
rolling mills also manufactured control systems. 59 The normal prac-
tice in the industry was for the purchaser of the mill to buy a control
system either directly from the system manufacturer or through the
mill manufacturer.1 60 The court held that the association of Allis-Chal-
mers and Blaw-Knox raised significant potential for entrenchment and
enjoined the merger of Allis-Chalmers and White.' 61
In Kennecolt Copper Corp. v. FTC162 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was primarily concerned with the effect of a proposed merger on
the metal rolling mill market. 294 F. Supp. 1263, 1266-67 (D. Del. 1969). The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's decision on the likelihood of success on the merits.
414 F.2d 506, 525-26 (3d Cir. 1969). But see id at 527-31 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (overturning
trial court decision to deny preliminary injunction improper exercise of appellate court powers).
153. 414 F.2d 506, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1969). See general l 58 GEo. L.J. 609 (1970).
154. Id at 517. But see id at 517 n.18.
155. Id at 517. But see id at 517 n.18.
156. Id at 518.
157. Id The top two manufacturers of control systems, General Electric and Westinghouse,
controlled over 80% of the market. Allis-Chalmers ran a very distant third. Id
158. Id
159. Id at 517.
160. Id at 517-18.
161. Id at 518. The court found also that the acquisition would produce a substantial likeli-
hood of reciprocal dealings. Id at 518-19.
Judge Aldisert vigorously dissented from the majority's application of entrenchment analysis to
the facts of the case. He found that the evidence did not support a finding that Allis-Chalmers
would enjoy any more competitive advantages than present manufacturers. Id at 537. He stated
that "[u]pon this emaciated skeleton of facts, the cloak of anti-competitive effects just does not fit."
Id
162. 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
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potential competition. 163 The court also found, however, that a merger
between Kennecott, the leading copper producer in the United
States,'" and Peabody Coal Company, the largest coal producer and
distributor in the nation,'65 would have an entrenching effect on the
coal industry. 66 The court found that the coal industry exhibited high
barriers to entry, primarily because of the industry's increasing depen-
dence on long-term supply contracts with electric utilities. 67 The coal
producing market, although not an oligopoly, was growing more
concentrated.168
Kennecott's large cash reserves or deep pocket'69 was the major fac-
tor in the court's entrenchment analysis. 7 ° Access to this cash reserve
would allow Peabody to purchase the large coal reserves essential to
meeting the demands of electric utilities. 7 ' Kennecott's acquisition of
163. Id at 74-78. The court found that Kennecott was the most likely entrant into the coal
producing market and consequently exerted a substantial influence on competition in the market.
Id at 79.
164. Id at 71. Kennecott's desire to enter the coal producing market stemmed from the di-
minishing vitality of the copper producing industry. Kennecott's copper reserves were shrinking,
as were the sources within the United States. Kennecott concluded that its future in copper pro-
ductions was limited and began liquidation. Id
165. Id at 72 & 81 app. I. In both 1966 and 1967, Peabody accounted for approximately 10%
of the total domestic coal production. Id
Peabody agreed to the acquisition for three reasons: (1) the decrease in the price of Kennecott's
shares, (2) an increase in governmental interest in limiting the sulfur content of coal to a level
below that of the coal Kennecott produced, and (3) investments in nuclear power by Kennecott's
two major customers whose sales accounted for 40% of Kennecott's total production. Id at 84-85
app. II.
166. Id at 78-79.
167. Id at 73-74. Other barriers to entry were the "experience, know-how and equipment"
necessary to meet the long term supply contracts, increased competition from oil companies for
coal reserves, id at 74, and the 10 to 15 year lag time before a company entering the market could
achieve a stable position. Id at 77. The court also found that "the coal industry had become so
complex and specialized even before the instant merger that it was virtually impossible for a
company with fewer resources than Kennecott to start a coal company by the acquisition of
reserves and equipment." Id
168. Id at 72-73. Prior to 1950, the coal industry was in decline. In 1959, however, the coal
industry rebounded, largely because of increased coal consumption. In 1947 the 68 companies
with an annual production of more than one million tons accounted for 48% of total production.
Their share of the market grew to 70% by 1967. In 1954 the top four firms had a 15.8% share of
the market. In 1967 the top four firms had increased their share to 29.2%; a growth rate of 160.5%.
Similarly, the top eight firms increased their market share from 23.6% in 1954 to 39.7% in 1967.
Id at 73.
169. See notes 68-71 smupra and accompanying text.
170. 467 F.2d at 78.
171. Id
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Peabody would thus stabilize Peabody's position in the industry and
negate any possibility of future deconcentration of the coal producing
market. 172
In cases subsequent to Kennecot, the federal courts have exhibited
increasing reluctance to nullify conglomerate mergers on entrenchment
grounds alone.173 In United States v. Black & Decker Manufacturing
172. Id Of the top coal producing firms, most were wholly owned subsidiaries of giant com-
panies like U.S. Steel, Standard Oil of Ohio, Gulf Oil, and General Dynamics. Id at 81-82 app. I.
The court did not answer Kennecott's assertion that the existence of these firms in the market
stabilized competitive conditions. Id at 74.
173. In the years between Kennecoll and Black & Decker, the federal courts had several op-
portunities to apply entrenchment analysis to conglomerate mergers. In no case did a court find
that the merger would entrench the market.
In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974), the court examined a proposed acquisition of Missouri Portland Cement Co., a major
midwest producer of portland cement, by Cargill, Inc., a huge bulk commodities trader. Id at
855-56. Missouri Portland held 28% of the St. Louis market in portland cement, 30% of the
Kansas City market, 30% of the Memphis market, 21% of the Omaha market, 9% of the Chicago
market, 10% of the Louisville market, and 15% of the Nashville market. Id at 856. The court
found that there was no synergistic interaction between the two companies' "products, customers,
or marketing techniques." Id at 862. Missouri Portland urged that Cargill's deep pocket would
raise entrance barriers and discourage competition by small competitors in the portland cement
market. Id at 865. The court found that many of the companies in the market were owned and
controlled by giants, such as U.S. Steel, who would not shrink before Cargill's financial strength.
Id The court concluded that "[i]n the cement industry... the 'deep pocket' claim seems more
metaphorical than real." Id
In Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177 (Ist Cir. 1975), the court dissolved a preliminary
injunction preventing Emhart, a large diversified corporation, from carrying out a tender offer for
USM, a major shoe machinery manufacturer. Id at 178-79. USM had 42% of the United States
market, reduced from 85% by court decree. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). USM argued that its acquisition by Emhart
would allow a transfer of Emhart's technological capabilities to USM, leading to a violation of
either the Sherman Act or the decree. 527 F.2d at 180-82. The court held that the entrenchment
doctrine does not deprive the merging companies of mere improvements in efficiency. The court
viewed entrenchment as primarily designed to prevent "artificial competitive advantages, such as
those derived from certain promotional and marketing techniques. . . ." Id at 182.
In United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1970), the court applied
entrenchment analysis to the proposed acquisition of Byron Jackson, Inc., a division of Borg-
Warner that manufactured drilling equipment for oil and gas wells, by Hughes Tool Co., the
leading manufacturer of rotary drill bits. Id at 638-39. Byron Jackson had 20% of the market in
"specialized surface rotary drilling products used in handling pipe and in the drilling completion,
production and workover of oil and gas wells." Id at 642. The court found that the market was
deconcentrating. From 1970 to 1974 the combined market share of the top four firms dropped
from 63% to 52%. Byron Jackson's market share dropped from 29% to 20% during the same
period of time. Id at 643. The court held that the acquisition would not have an entrenching
effect on the market because the two firms' manufacturing processes and marketing channels of-
fered no potential for synergetic interaction. Id at 645. Hughes consequently could not bestow
competitive advantages on Byron Jackson. Id
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Co. 174 a federal district court considered both potential competition 75
and entrenchment 76 challenges to a conglomerate merger and found
that neither theory showed the merger would have an anticompetitive
effect on the target market. 177 Black & Decker, a leading manufacturer
of portable electric power tools, 78 acquired McCulloch Corporation,
one of the largest manufacturers of gasoline-powered chain saws. 179 In
1972, the year before the merger, the gasoline-powered chain saw mar-
ket'8 was highly concentrated, with the top two firms holding a com-
bined market share of fifty-four percent.' 8'
The court focused initially on the two firms' product lines and found
that they presented little opportunity for synergistic interaction in tech-
nologies, brand name recognition, or marketing and manufacturing
systems.'1 2 A lack of synergistic interaction indicated that Black &
Decker could not bestow competitive advantages on McCulloch. 183
The court viewed the absence of synergy as a factor that substantially
174. 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
175. id at 743-73.
176. Id at 773-76.
177. Id at 782-83.
178. Id at 735. The market shares for both Black & Decker and McCulloch for their respec-
tive product lines were designated as confidential data by the court and omitted from the record.
Id at 733 n.1 & 735-36. In 1972 Black & Decker was 372nd in sales and 206th in net income of
the top 500 industrials. Id at 735. In 1973 Black & Decker had net earnings of $33 million on
sales of $427 million. Its assets in 1972 were $273 million. Id
179. Id at 736. In 1972 McCulloch had net sales of $60 million and net assets of between $64
million and $65 million. However, during that same year, McCulloch showed an operating loss of
nearly $1.4 million. It
180. The court found that the relevant product market was the manufacture and sale of gas-
powered chain saws. The court also found that a significant submarket existed for gas-powered
chain saws selling for less than $200. Id at 740.
181. Id at 748. The top four firms had a combined market share of 77% and the top eight
firms had 93%. Id From 1970 to 1974 the combined market share of the top two firms dropped
from 54.6% to 48.4%. The combined market share of the top four firms grew from 71.9% to 75.1%
during that same period. The combined market share of the top eight firms for that same period
dropped slightly from 92.9% to 92%. Id
182. Id at 774. The court found that the technologies involved in manufacturing Black &
Decker's products, which were predominantly electrically driven, were not complementary to
those involved in producing McCulloch's product, which was gas driven. Furthermore, McCul-
loch marketed its products in rural areas, while Black & Decker marketed in urban areas. Id
Because of the disparity in markets, the only area of possible brand name recognition was in the
occasional user gasoline-powered chain saw market. Id at 774-75.
183. 1d at 776. The court concluded that "Black & Decker does not appear capable of confer-
ring decisive competitive advantages that could result in McCulloch dominating gas chain saw
markets." Id
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lessened the probability that the merger would entrench the market. 184
The court also discussed the role of advertising in chain saw sales
and concluded it was of limited utility.'85 The court found that gas-
powered chain saws, unlike the chemically identical bleaches in Procter
& Gamble,'8 6 were not dependent on advertising for product differenti-
ation. 187 Manufacturers produced a wide variety of chain saws, which
met a broad range of consumer needs.' A transfer of Black & Deck-
er's advertising and promotional expertise on McCulloch would thus
not entrench the market in gas-powered chain saws. 189
The court finally considered the strength and vitality of other com-
petitors in the target market and concluded that the merger would not
lessen competition. 90 Many of the other competitors were equal to
Black & Decker in financial strength.' 9 ' Those competitors conse-
quently had little reason to fear predatory acts or domination by Black
& Decker. 192
More recently,193 a federal district court in Carrier Corp. v. United
184. Id at 774. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 944-46 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp.
983, 992-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 544-
56, 564-65 (N.D. IlM. 1968).
185. 430 F. Supp. 729, 775 (D. Md. 1976).
186. See notes 107-11 supra and accompanying text.
187. 430 F. Supp. 729, 775 (D. Md. 1976). The court noted the distinction by observing that
"unlike liquid bleaches which were chemically indistinguishable and therefore relied exclusively
on advertising for product differentiation, gas powered chain saws offer a variety of different fea-
tures tailored to heterogeneous types of purchasers and requirements." Id
188. Id
189. Id
190. Id at 775-76.
191. Id Many of McCulloch's competitors were subsidiaries or divisions of large corporations
such as Sears & Roebuck, Gulf & Western, and Emerson Electric Company. Id
192. Id at 775.
193. In the period between Black & Decker and Carrier the federal courts had several occa-
sions to consider entrenchnat claims. In Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,
435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977), the court considered a proposed acquisition of Babcock &
Wilcox, a manufacturer of steam generating equipment, by United Technologies, a huge diversi-
fied firm. Id at 1253. The court addressed the merger's potential entrenching effects in six mar-
kets: (1) the utility fossil fuel boiler market, (2) the utility nuclear steam system market, (3) the
commercial fossil fuel steam propulsion market, (4) the commercial nuclear steam propulsion
market, (5) the naval fossil fuel steam propulsion market, and (6) the naval nuclear steam pro-
pulsion market. Id at 1287. The court's primary concern was United's ability to transfer its
extensive research and development expertise to Babcock & Wilcox. The court found that a trans-
fer of research and development would not materially aid Babcock & Wilcox's market power. In
the utility fossil fuel steam boiler market, the court found that the possibility of anticompetitive
effects arising from the transfer was entirely speculative. Babcock & Wilcox was not a dominant
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Technologies Corp. 194 refused to find that Carrier's access to United's
technological capabilities would entrench the target market. 195 United,
a very large manufacturer of highly diversified products, 196 sought to
acquire Carrier, the largest manufacturer of heating and air condition-
ing systems. 197 The court concentrated on the merger's potential an-
ticompetitive effects in four distinct submarkets' 98 of the heating and
air conditioning systems market: (1) unitary systems, 199 (2) applied
power in either the utility nuclear steam system market or the naval fossil fuel steam propulsion
market and, consequently, the probability of entrenchment was nonexistent. Babcock & Wilcox
was a dominant force in the commercial fossil fuel steam propulsion market, but consumers in
that market were increasingly turning to diesel-fueled boilers. The commercial nuclear steam
propulsion market was insignificant because of the prohibitive start-up costs. Babcock & Wilcox
was a major force in the naval nuclear steam propulsion market, but United's research and devel-
opment would add nothing to Babcock & Wilson's competitive posture. Id The court found also
that the entrance of a giant like United would not have a chilling effect on competition in the
market because consumers in the market were highly sophisticated. Id at 1287-88. This con-
aumer sophistication mitigated the possibility of unreasonable domination by one competitor. Id
In FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977), the court examined a proposed
acquisition of Anaconda Co., a major copper and aluminum ore processor, by Atlantic Richfield
Co. (Arco), a giant producer of petroleum and petroleum products. Id at 291. In 1977 Arco was
the fifteenth largest in sales and revenues and thirteenth largest in assets of all publicly-held cor-
porations in the nation. Id Anaconda, with an 8.27% share, was the third largest producer in the
market of copper ore. The two top companies in that market held a combined market share of
30%. Anaconda ranked fourth in the refined copper market with a 9.78% share. The top three
firms held a combined market share of 60%. Id The court held without discussion that the merger
would not entrench Anaconda because it was not a top competitor in either market. Id at 298
n.12.
194. [1978-21 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,393 (N.D.N.Y.).
195. Id at 76,366-68.
196. Id at 76,361. Among United's many products were jet engines, electrical control systems,
elevators, energy management systems, industrial compressors, and industrial gas turbines.
197. Id
198. Submarkets are the distinct product lines within a more general product market. In
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Supreme Court provided the classic
definition of a submarket:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable inter-
changeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries
of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry
or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's pecu-
liar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct
prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.
d at 325. See also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95 (1957).
The court in Carrier also considered the submarket for industrial gas turbines. [1978-2] TRADE
CAs. (CCH) 62,393 at 76,367 (N.D.N.Y.). The court was concerned with the potential entrench-
ment of United, and not Carrier, in the turbine market. Id at 76,368.
199. [1978-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,393 at 76,361. The court accepted, id at 76,302, the
Washington University Open Scholarship
564 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:537
systems,2°° (3) compressors, 20 1 and (4) waste heat recovery systems.20 2
In the unitary and applied systems markets, the major development
was "smart" electronic controls.2 "3 United, through its affiliate Essex,
manufactured control systems but was not a leader in that market,2 4
Carrier, although the leader in research and development in heating
and air conditioning systems2 °0 had not developed an electronic control
system.2"6 The court found that Carrier's association with Essex would
not have a substantial impact on the unitary and applied systems mar-
kets.2"7 Any benefits that Carrier would derive were available to Car-
rier's competitors through joint ventures with control systems
manufacturers. 0 8
In the compressor market, Carrier, through its Elliot division, pro-
duced twenty percent of the large industrial compressors and a small
number of the industrial axial compressors.0 9 United manufactured
axial compressors for jet aircraft but had never considered entering the
industrial axial compressor market.210  The court found that the tech-
nology involved in producing aircraft axials was significantly different
from that for industrial compressors.211 United consequently could not
transfer a competitive advantage to Carrier in the compressor
definitions of unitary systems urged by United, that is, "systems consisting of various components
contained in a metal package or envelope, assembled at the manufacturing plant for installation in
a structure." id
200. Id at 76,362. Applied systems were heating or air conditioning systems put together and
installed at a site under construction. Id
201. Id at 76,366.
202. Id at 76,368. As defined by the court, "[a] waste heat recovery system places a turbine in
the path of the exhaust stream of a catalytic cracker thereby converting otherwise wasted energy
into rotating power." Id
203. Id at 76,363.
204. Id The leading firms were Minneapolis Honeywell and Johnson Controls. General Elec-
tric, ITT, Westinghouse, and Singer all had the capability of producing control systems. Id
205. Id Carrier spent $30 million on research and development in 1977, three times the ex-
penditure of its nearest competitor. Id
206. Id Carrier, however, had controls capability through its Spectral division. Id
207. Id at 76,366.
208. Id at 76,364. The court found that Carrier and its nearest competitor, Trane, were reluc-
tant to enter into such joint-ventures because it would expose valuable information. The court
stated that nondisclosure agreements would adequately protect the information. Id
209. Id at 76,366. The major competitors in the compressor market, other than Carrier, were
Ingersoll-Rand, Cooper Industries, Allis-Chalmers, De La Val, and the Dresser Division of Clark
Industries. Id
210. Id
211. Id
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market.2 12
As to waste heat recovery systems, the court found that United's
technological expertise was potentially useful to Carrier.2 13  Carrier,
through its Elliot division, manufactured turbines specifically for waste
heat recovery systems.214 United did not make turbines for that pur-
pose, but did produce aircraft turbines.215 Even though United's tech-
nology was potentially useful to Carrier, the court ultimately
determined that this expertise was readily available from other
sources.
216
Despite the federal courts' current reluctance to rely on entrench-
ment analysis, the FTC has continued to challenge acquisitions on en-
trenchment grounds. 217 Recently, in In re Beatrice Foods Co.,2 ts an
212. Id at 76,367.
213. Id at 76,368.
214, Id
215. Id
216. Id The court found that United's technological expertise in materials, coating, and cool-
ing, which were available elsewhere, might benefit Carrier. Id
217. See In re Beatrice Foods Co., No. 9112 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980); In re Heublein, Inc., 96
F.T.C. 385 (1980); In re Tenneco Inc., 96 F.T.C. 346 (1980).
In In re Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385 (1980), the Commission overturned an AL's finding that
Heublein's acquisition of United Vintners, Inc. would entrench United in the market of all wines.
Id at 574. In 1968 Heublein was the fifth largest manufacturer and marketer of alcoholic bever-
ages, mostly beer and distilled spirits. Id at 574-75. Heublein was sixteenth in wine sales, with
.79% of the market. In that same year, United was the second largest producer and marketer of
wines with a 17.9% share of the market. Id at 576. United and its chief competitor, Galo, held a
combined market share of 41.9%. Id at 575. The ALU held that the merger would entrench the
wine market because Heublein had conferred market advantages on United in three ways: (1) ac-
cess to cheaper financing and capital, (2) access to advertising efficiencies, and (3) possible lever-
aging of United's products by tying them to Heublein's popular liquor products. Id at 553-56.
The Commission found that although Heublein had provided new capital, arranged financing,
and provided a loan for United, it had not done so at a lower cost than United had before the
acquisition. Furthermore, most of United's competitors were owned by financially strong con-
glomerates or large distillers, such as Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Inc. and Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. Their presence in the alcoholic beverage market watered down any competitive advantage to
United. Id at 594-95.
As to advertising efficiencies, the Commission ruled that they were of little benefit in the wine
industry. Wines varied significantly in price and quality. Advertising, consequently, was not nec-
essary for sales promotion in the market. Id at 595-96.
In addition, the Commission found that a possibility of leveraging was insufficient to prove
anticompetitive effect. Leveraging of products by tying them to popular brands was always possi-
ble in a product extension merger. A tying arrangement was also illegal under § 3 of the Clayton
Act and § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id at 596-99.
218. No. 9112 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980).
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ALJ ordered divestiture of a company exclusively because of the en-
trenching effects of the acquisition.
Beatrice Foods Company, the nation's leading processor of diversi-
fied food products, t9 acquired Tropicana Products, Inc., the leading
processor 220 of chilled orange juice.221  The chilled orange juice mar-
ket,z2 although rapidly expanding,2z was highly concentrated with the
top four firms holding sixty percent of the market.224 Beatrice had a
very small share of the market225 through its extensive holding of dairy
219. Id at 6-7.
220. Id at 7. In 1978, the year of the merger, Tropicana held the top position in the chilled
orange juice market with almost 30% of the market in gallons sold and nearly 31% of the market
in dollars. In that year, Tropicana's major competitors were Minute Maid, a division of the Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., with 15.5% of the market in gallons sold and 15.4% in dollars, Kraft, with 10.5%
in gallons and 11.5% in dollars, and H.P. Hood, with 4.4% in gallons and 4.0% in dollars. Id at
24.
221. The Commission defined chilled orange juice as "chilled single strength orange juice
made: (1) by squeezing fresh oranges, (2) by adding water to FCOJ [frozen concentrate orange
juice], or (3) by thawing frozen single strength orange juice." Id at 5.
222. The A.J found that the chilled orange juice market constituted a separate market from
frozen concentrate orange juice and canned single strength orange juice. Id at 9. The AIJ found
also that the chilled orange juice market was composed of two submarkets: the retail or grocery
store market and the institutional customer market, id at 10, and limited his analysis to the retail
chilled orange juice market. Id at 11. The ALJ excluded home delivery from the retail chilled
orange juice market.
During the proceeding before the ALJ, the FTC asked a federal district court for a preliminary
injunction restraining consummation of the merger. The district court denied the injunction, see
FTC v. Beatrice Foods Co., 587 F.2d 1225, 1228 app. (D.C. Cir. 1978), and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed. Id at 1230 app. The FTC filed a motion for a rehearing en
bane that the Court of Appeals granted and remanded to the district court for further findings of
fact. Id at 1231 app. The Court of Appeals then denied the rehearing en banc after receiving the
district court's findings. Id at 1233 app., 1226. The district court divided the orange juice market
into three submarkets: (I) ready to serve juice, (2) ready to serve and institutional frozen juice,
and (3) ready to serve and all frozen juice. Id at 1233 app. (Appendix to Joint Statement of
Judges MacKinnon And Robb). The district court found that a major portion of Beatrice's distri-
bution consisted of home delivery. Id
223. No. 9112 at 13 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980).
224. Id at 24. The catalyst of the trend toward increased concentration was Minute Maid. Id
at 61. Minute Maid, with the backing of its parent Coca-Cola, entered the market in 1970 and
captured a 19.4% share of the market by 1979. Id at 55. The vehicle for Minute Maid's rapid
expansion was co-packing agreements with dairies. Pursuant to those agreements, Minute Maid
shipped frozen concentrated orange juice to a dairy, which reconstituted the concentrate and then
distributed it locally. Id at 51-52. The benefit to Minute Maid was increased cost savings. Id
225. Id at 41. The ALJ used the market statistics provided by the FTC. The district court and
court of appeals rejected those statistics because they involved double counting by the FTC. 587
F.2d at 1234 app. (Appendix To Joint Statement of Judges Mac Kinnon and Robb). By either the
ALJ's measure (.39%) or the district court's (less than .5%), id, Beatrice Foods' share was ex-
tremely small.
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plants226 that reconstituted frozen concentrated orange juice and deliv-
ered it to grocery stores.227
The ALJ found that the merger would allow Tropicana access to Be-
atrice's extensive processing and distribution system228 and thus confer
a substantial competitive advantage on Tropicana.2 29 Although Tropi-
cana distributed nationally, its largest sales were in the East and South-
east, close to its Florida processing plant.230 The prohibitive cost of
transporting juice to other areas of the country23' had prevented Tropi-
cana from gaining a significant market share anywhere but the eastern
states.z 2 With access to Beatrice's processing and distribution system,
Tropicana could tap the western market and consequently further con-
tract the national market.233 The anticompetitive effects that would
result were sufficient for the AJ to invalidate the acquisition.234
226. Id at 7. In 1978 Beatrice was the nation's leading milk processor and distributor. Id
The district court found that Beatrice did not operate any dairies in Tropicana's major sales areas.
587 F.2d at 1232 app. (Appendix To Joint Statement of Judges MacKinnon and Robb).
227. No. 9112 at 7 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980).
228. The ALJ had included nearly all distribution systems within his definition of the retail
chilled orange juice market. Id at 16. Tropicana, according to the AL, distributed chilled orange
juice to chain store warehouses, wholesale warehouses, and dairies. The ALJ found that Beatrice
distributed chilled orange juice to wholesale distributors, independent grocery stores, and individ-
ual stores in a chain store line, id at 17-18, but left out Beatrice Foods' substantial home delivery
sales. Id The district court found that Beatrice distributed chilled orange juice to homes, restau-
rants, institutional customers, and small local independent groceries. 587 F.2d at 1232. It found
further that Beatrice did not distribute to the chain store warehouses and wholesale warehouses
that were customers of Tropicana. Id
229. No. 9112 at 66-67 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980).
230. Id at 27-28.
231. The AUJ found that most dairies did not distribute beyond a 150 mile radius. Distribu-
tion to warehouses, however, increased the sales radius to 500 miles. Id at 49. The greatest
shipping costs were for chilled orange juice in glass containers which were slowly disappearing
from the market. Id at 51.
232. Id at 53.
233. Id at 66-67. The ALJ found that but for the merger Tropicana would have built a recon-
stituting plant in California. Id at 66. Because Beatrice Foods already had dairies in California
and the Midwest, Tropicana would distribute through them instead of through its own plant. Id
at 66-67. The district court found, however, that "[c]onsistent with the long standing practice of
Beatrice, Tropicana will be operated as a completely separate and virtually autonomous subsidi-
ary of Beatrice ... " 587 F.2d at 1234 app. (Appendix To Joint Statement of Judges MacKinnon
and Robb). The district court also found that there would not "be any change in Tropicana's
method of operation in the processing and sale of orange juice." Id
234. No. 9112 at 65-66 (FTC Nov. 21, 1980).
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III. A CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL ENTRENCHMENT ANALYSIS
The disparity between the federal courts' recent reluctance to ap-
prove and the FTC's eagerness to pursue entrenchment challenges indi-
cates that a critical review of precedent is necessary. Analysis reveals
that reliance on precedent that supports entrenchment theory as an in-
dependent basis for invalidating a conglomerate merger is misplaced.
In Ekco235 the court held that the acquisition of McClintock en-
trenched the target markets because Ekco's financial resources allowed
McClintock to merge horizontally with Blackman.236 After Ekco's ac-
quisition of McClintock, however, McClintock's market share de-
creased dramatically because of vigorous competition from
Blackman.237 McClintock's market share increased only after its acqui-
sition of Blackman.238 The catalyst for increased concentration in the
markets was McClintock's acquisition of Blackman and not Ekco's ac-
quisition of McClintock.239 The court found that McClintock's acqui-
sition of Blackman, which was related to the Ekco/McClintock merger
only by Ekco's deep pocket, was per se illegal.240 The thrust of the
court's decision thus was that Ekco's acquisition of McClintock allowed
McClintock to engage in essentially unrelated per se illegal acts. In
that context, the court was unjustified in finding that Ekco's acquisition
of McClintock entrenched the target markets.
In Procter & Gamble,2a" the Supreme Court held that the acquisition
of Clorox would entrench the liquid bleach market primarily because
Procter & Gamble could provide Clorox with a competitive advantage
in advertising.242 Television advertising rate structures at that time,
however, did not favor large firms.243 Furthermore, Purex, Clorox's
only major competitor, possessed the financial resources to meet or ex-
ceed Clorox's advertising expenditures.244
In addition, the Supreme Court observed that Clorox, with Procter &
235. Ekco Products v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). See notes 88-97supra and accompa-
nying text.
236. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
237. See note 96 supra.
238. Id
239. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
240. See note 93 supra.
241. See notes 98-115 supra and accompanying text.
242. See text accompanying notes 107-111 supra.
243. See note 124 supra.
244. Id
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Gamble's financial backing, could chill competition by engaging in
predatory pricing.24 5 In a subsequent action in which Purex sued
Procter & Gamble for damages arising from the merger,246 the court
found that Procter & Gamble had not used its deep pocket to Clorox's
advantage.247 Clorox did not engage in any acts, anticompetitive or
otherwise, after the merger that it had not undertaken prior to the
merger.248 Purex, in addition, was not intimidated and continued to
compete aggressively, as shown by its increased sales249 and entry into
new geographic markets.250
In General Foods25' the court held that S.O.S's access to General
Foods' advertising budget, 2 plus General Foods' sheer size, would up-
set the pre-merger competitive balance between S.O.S. and Brillo and
entrench the metal soap pad market.253 S.O.S. increased its market
share with advertising aid from General Foods, but this increase fol-
lowed five years of steady decline.254 An increase in advertising ex-
penditures was not inconsistent with a market share decrease.2 55 The
additional expenditures went primarily for prime time television adver-
tisements.256 Television rate structures did not favor large firms257 and
consequently S.O.S. did not buy anything that it could not purchase
prior to the merger.
The merger may have initially upset the competitive balance with
Brillo. Subsequent to the merger, but prior to the court's decision,
however, Purex acquired Brillo. s Purex was a large firm that actively
competed against giants in other markets. 259 A Purex-backed Brillo
would have little fear of competing against General Foods.
In Wilson,26° the decisive factor in the court's entrenchment analysis
245. See text accompanying notes 112-15 supra.
246. See note 111 supra.
247. Id
248. See note 113 supra.
249. See note 111 supra.
250. See note 11 supra.
251. See notes 116-29 supra and accompanying text.
252. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra.
254. See note 120 supra.
255. See note 124 supra.
256. Id
257. Id
258. See note 125 supra.
259. See notes 111 & 128 supra.
260. See notes 130-51 supra and accompanying text.
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was that Nissen would have access to Wilson's extensive distribution
system.26' Nissen, however, relied primarily on a small sales force that
presold Nissen equipment to consumers.262 The discriminating pur-
chasers of gymnastic equipment were impervious to advertising and the
uninformed sales pitches of distributors dealing in hundreds of sports
products.263 In the Nissen system, distributors acted largely as conduits
for the equipment.2 4 Furthermore, Wilson had represented both to
Nissen's shareholders and to the court that Wilson's and Nissen's distri-
bution systems would remain separate.265
The Wilson court found also that the merger would prompt other
large manufacturers to enter the market, driving out smaller competi-
tors and thus alter the market structure.266 The market for gymnastic
equipment, marked by low barriers to entry,267 was rapidly ex-
panding.2 68 Increased sales attracted many new entrants269 and contin-
ued to do so in the face of the Wilson/Nissen merger.270 Moreover, the
other major manufacturers had all expressed interest in entering prior
to learning of Wilson's proposed acquisition of Nissen.271
In AYis-Chalmers,272 the court found that the association of Blaw-
Knox, White's subsidiary, and Allis-Chalmers would turn them into
the only firm that could deliver a metal rolling mill complete with a
control system.273 The court held that this competitive advantage
would entrench the market.274  Blaw-Knox, however, was only the
third largest manufacturer of rolling mills.275 The top two firms in the
control systems market held an eighty percent share.276 Allis-Chalmers
was a distant third.277 If the merger enhanced Allis-Chalmers' market
261. See text accompanying notes 140-45 supra.
262. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
263. Id
264. Id
265. Id
266. See text accompanying notes 147-51 supra.
267. See note 134 supra.
268. See note 133 supra.
269. See note 134 supra.
270. See note 151 supra.
271. See note 148 supra.
272. See notes 152-61 supra and accompanying text.
273. See text accompanying notes 158-60 supra.
274. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
275. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
276. See note 157 supra.
277. Id
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position, then it may have induced increased competition in the control
systems market. Allis-Chalmers' competitive advantage may have
shaken the top two firms from their dominant position. The merger
that was invalidated as anticompetitive thus may have actually pro-
duced a procompetitive effect.278
In Kennecott,279 the court found that Kennecott could confer its deep
pocket on Peabody, allowing Peabody to purchase coal reserves, and
consequently entrench the coal producing market.280 The coal produc-
ing market, however, was highly competitive. 281 Although the top
eight firms had increased their combined market share, the market,
with increased coal consumption, was expanding.2"2 Large oil compa-
nies actively competed with the coal producers for coal reserves.28 3
Furthermore, most of Peabody's competitors were wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of huge corporations.2s Peabody's competitors consequently
had access to deep pocket advantages similar to those bestowed on
Peabody.
In Black & Decker285 and Carrier,2 6 the courts confronted classic
entrenchment situations. Both cases involved a large firm acquiring a
major competitor in a concentrated market.287 Both courts went be-
yond surface considerations to appraise realistically the potential for
entrenchment. The key factor for both courts was the lack of synergy
between the acquired and acquiring firm's product lines.288 Both courts
also assessed the nature of competition, types of consumers, and the
strength of competitors in the markets.289 Both courts took a broad,
comprehensive view of the markets and refused to hold that the merg-
ers would entrench the markets.
In Beatrice Foods2 ° the ALJ found that Beatrice Foods' processing
and distribution system would add substantially to Tropicana's market
278. See generally Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1371.
279. See notes 162-72 supra and accompanying text.
280. See text accompanying notes 169-72 supra.
281. See note 168 supra.
282. Id
283. See note 167 supra.
284. See note 172 supra.
285. See notes 174-92 supra and accompanying text.
286. See notes 194-216 supra and accompanying text.
287. See notes 178-81 & 196-97 supra and accompanying text.
288. See notes 182-84, 209-12 & 215-16 supra and accompanying text.
289. See notes 185-92 & 204-15 supra and accompanying text.
290. See notes 219-33 supra and accompanying text.
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power and entrench the chilled orange juice market.2 91 A federal dis-
trict court, which refused to enjoin the merger pending the ALJ deci-
sion,292 found that Beatrice and Tropicana operated in different
geographic markets293 and distributed to different types of custom-
ers.294 If Beatrice operated Tropicana is an autonomous subsidiary, as
the district court found was the intended plan,295 access to Beatrice's
distribution system would not benefit Tropicana.
Furthermore, Tropicana faced stiff competition from Minute Maid, a
subsidiary of Coca Cola. Minute Maid had entered the market in 1970
and increased its market share to nearly twenty percent by 1979.296
With Coca Cola's backing, Minute Maid possessed the potential to
meet any competitive challenge Tropicana might offer.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ENTRENCHMENT THEORY
Critical review of the precedent reveals that the judiciary has taken
two very different approaches to entrenchment analysis. In Black &
Decker and Carrier, the courts performed a thorough assessment of all
pertinent facts. The courts from Procter & Gamble through Kennecolt
and the ALJ in Beatrice Foods relied on the assumptions underlying
entrenchment theory and neglected to analyze actual competitive con-
ditions in the target markets. For entrenchment theory to survive as an
independent basis for invalidating conglomerate mergers, it must rest
on a firm empirical foundation.2 97
Entrenchment theory assumes that a conglomerate's acquisition of a
dominant firm in an oligopolistic market yields predominantly an-
ticompetitive effects.298 The acquiring conglomerate supposedly con-
fers competitive advantages on the acquired firm that entrench the
acquired firm2 99 in its market position."° The entrenching acquisition
291. See text accompanying notes 228-33 supra.
292. See note 222 supra.
293. See note 226 supra.
294. See note 233 supra.
295. Id.
296. See note 224 supra.
297. See notes 33 & 34 supra.
298. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Stanley Works v. FTC,
469 F.2d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
299. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
300. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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allegedly raises entrance barriers, 30 1 paralyzes competition,302 and pro-
vides opportunities for predatory pricing.30 3
The economies of scale that result from such a merger can, however,
actually produce competitive advantages. 3°4 Low capital costs, an ex-
tensive distribution system, and high levels of technological innovation
are nothing more than efficiencies inherent in the conglomerate's
size.3 °5 With respect to capital costs, for example, the difference is sig-
nificant only if the discrepancy in firm size is large.3 °6 The realization
of these advantages by a large conglomerate can stimulate competitors
to seek their own means of reducing costs. 307 Once one firm achieves
economies of scale, only the efficient firms are likely to remain in the
market.30 8 Economies of scale create lower costs that not only accrue
to management and shareholders but also benefit consumers in the
form of reduced prices.31 If the judicial entrenchment theory pro-
motes inefficiency by impeding economies of scale, it contravenes the
underlying policy of the antitrust laws, which is to advance
competition. 10
A conglomerate's acquisition of a firm in a highly concentrated mar-
ket will potentially raise barriers to entry only if the acquired firm be-
comes the dominant force in the market.31 If the conglomerate
acquires any firm but the leading firm, then the acquisition may act to
introduce a new competitive force to the market.312 The acquired firm
may then threaten to increase its market share at the expense of the
leading firm.3 3 The acquisition may thus increase competition.31 4
301. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
302. See notes 76 & 77 supra and accompanying text.
303. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
304. See Brodley, supra note 5, at 362. See also notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
305. See Note, supra note 12, at 347.
306. See Turner, supra note 12, at 1338.
307. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 584 (1967) (larlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. Il. 1968). See generally
G. BENSTON, supra note 22, at 51; Turner, supra note 12, at 1355; Note, supra note 12, at 348.
308. See generally Edwards, supra note 12, at 350.
309. See Note, supra note 12, at 347.
310. On the policy underlying the antimerger provisions of the antitrust laws, see Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). See also Turner, supra note 12, at 1326.
311. See United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). See generally C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 128;
Sloviter, supra note 41, at 888-89.
312. See Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 1371.
313. See generally Blair, supra note 5, at 693.
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Even acquisition of the leading firm does not necessarily stifle com-
petition or raise barriers to entry.31 5 Courts have recognized the
probability that a conglomerate's merger with the dominant firm may
stimulate competition. 6  Smaller competitors may increase their ef-
forts to maintain a competitive position in the industry, particularly if
they have actively competed in the past.317 If the smaller firms have
sufficient financial power, then they may not fear the acquiring firm's
influence.31 8
Predatory pricing in the conglomerate merger context is unlikely to
occur for several reasons.319 One formidable disincentive is that preda-
tory pricing is illegal under both the Robinson-Patman Act320 and sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.321  Presumably, a conglomerate's
management will not risk treble damage liability and criminal prosecu-
tion.321 In addition, a firm exercising sound business judgment will not
willingly sustain an immediate and possibly substantial loss when later
recovery of those losses is dependent upon a larger market share that
may never materialize.32 Unless entrance barriers to the market are
very high, other firms will enter the market, attracted by the conglom-
erate's profits, and stifle recoupment.3 24 Thus, the conglomerate price
cutter may never recover his losses. Moreover, to invalidate an alleg-
edly entrenching conglomerate merger because it may foster predatory
pricing is illogical because both de novo 325 entry and toehold acquisi-
314. See generally Turner, supra note 12, at 1357.
315. See generally G. BENSTON, supra note 22, at 51; Turner, upra note 12, at 1328.
316. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 584 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring),
Accord, United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. IlL. 1968).
317. See Turner, supra note 12, at 1352-53.
318. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865-66 & n.32 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,775
(D. Md. 1976); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. I11.
1968); In re Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 FTC 477, 605-06 (1972). See generally Turner, supra note 12,
at 1356-67.
319. See generally Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Care of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 223 (1970); Goldberg, supra note 12; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard 01
(N.) Case, I J.L. & EcON. 137 (1958); Zerbe, The American Sugar Refnery Company, 1887-1914:
The Story ofa Monopoly, 12 J.L. & Eco. 339 (1969). See also notes 56-58 supra and accompany-
ing text.
320. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). See generally Davidow, supra note 5, at 1256.
321. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
322. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 & 15 (1976). See Davidow, supra note 5, at 1256.
323. See Davidow, supra note 5, at 1256; Turner, supra note 12, at 1341-42.
324. See Turner, supra note 12, at 1341-42.
325. See note 36 supra.
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tion326 provide the same pricing opportunities.327
A conglomerate's entry into an oligopolistic market may bear
procompetitive benefits. The interdependence of firms in an oligopolis-
tic market leads to inefficiency. 328 The conglomerate's entry will cause
these firms to develop more economical procedures. 329 If the competi-
tors in an oligopolistic market continue to compete vigorously after the
conglomerate's entry, then they act as agents to preserve competition
and promote deconcentration.33 ° Mere increases in concentration
caused by a conglomerate's entry are consequently insufficient to show
anticompetitive impact.
33
'
The alleged anticompetitive effects of the entrenching merger are
more often attacks on corporate bigness than realistic assessments of
market impact. Commentators fear that corporate bigness is the source
of substantial competitive advantages. 332 The courts, however, have not
adopted a per se rule against large corporate size.333 An assault on size
fails to consider the probability of the conglomerate's entry producing
procompetitive effects.334 A conglomerate merger may yield advances
in technology and lower costs, forcing smaller firms to compete more
326. Id
327. See Note, supra note 86, at 634.
328. See Turner, supra note 12, at 1317.
329. Id
330. See generaly Note, supra note 12, at 338.
331. See, e.g., United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); United States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
See generally Note, supra note 12, at 338.
332. See Edwards, supra note 12, at 347-37 (1955).
333. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc. 498 F.2d 851, 865 n.32 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1979); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 319-20 (N.D. Ill. 1965). In
some cases the court's analysis of alleged anticompetitive affects is so cursory that it verges on a
per se bigness test. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970); General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); Ekco Prods.,
Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). See generally Sichel, The Procter & Gamble-Clorox
Decision and the Economics of Conglomerate Mergers, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1081 (1967).
334. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 538 (3d Cir.
1969) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1968); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817,
821 (N.D. Cal), appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963).
In Aiis.Chalmers, the dissent summed up the "bigness is bad" theory:
This hypothesis is nothing more than a restatement of a "Brandeisian bias in favor of
human sized institutions," a nostalgic attempt to equate bigness with badness. But Con-
gress has not written this theory into its anti-trust legislation; nor should any court at-
tempt to legislate such a doctrine into it. So long as the legislative proscription of
antitrust activities turns on factors beyond the mere "possibilities" of anti-competitive
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aggressively. 35 If firms in the market have competed aggressively
prior to the merger, then they will continue to do so afterwards. 36
V. CONCLUSION
Continued reliance on entrenchment analysis in conglomerate
merger cases is highly questionable. The decisions supporting en-
trenchment analysis fail to provide a comprehensive review of all com-
petitive factors in the target market. The courts that provide a
comprehensive review fail to find entrenchment. A conglomerate's ac-
quisition of a dominant firm in an oligopolistic market does not neces-
sarily lead to increased concentration in the market. The conglomerate
rarely bestows competitive advantages on the acquired firm that en-
trenches the market. Review of the fundamental presumptions of en-
trenchment analysis indicates that entrenchment theory bears little
resemblance to actual market conditions. An entrenchment challenge
by itself is consequently insufficient to invalidate a conglomerate
merger.
Cristofer Esty Lord
effects, the courts must be diligent not to substitute the Brandeisian bias for sound analy-
sis.
The characterization of a company as a "large conglomerate" should not impose a
presumption of anti-competitive guilt Section 7 of the Clayton Act nowhere so pro-
vides. It is the company's activities-not its firm and size-which the Congress has
sought to regulate.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 538 (3d Cir. 1969) (Aldisert,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970) (footnote omitted). See generally Sichel, supra
note 333, at 1083; Turner, supra note 12, at 1317 & 1328; Note, supra note 86, at 635.
Courts and commentators have suggested that it is Congress' job to legislate against corporate
bigness. See United States v. ITT (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19, 54 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal ds.
missed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1096
(N.D. IlM. 1969). See generally Sloviter, supra note 41, at 890-91.
335. See Turner, supra note 12, at 1352-53. But Sf Asch, supra note 54, at 131-32 (empirical
evidence inconclusive as to whether inventiveness increases with size).
336. In Stanley Work., the dissent stated that "size does not carry any competitive advantages
in this industry, where small companies thrive and have increased in number". Stanley Works v.
FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 511 (2d Cir. 1972) (Mansfield, 3., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
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